Fraud Protection with Wallet Control
Wallet-Control is a program for operator self-billing. At the end of a shift, the cash and non-cash receipts taken can be recorded.
Often as soon as complex counts or, as here, revenue inventories take place, clerical errors or misunderstandings can occur. Wallet-Control prevents this by simply entering the stocks of coins, notes and receipts for the programme to calculate totals and evaluate differences.
Best practice single-variety denomination recording with Wallet Control
The single-sort capture of coins and banknotes, as well as other receipts, usually leads to faster and smoother operator accounting. Differences due to counting errors can usually be explained quickly.
Depending on the hierarchy of your company, an indirect control of a possible subsequent responsible department or employee is thus also carried out, since the information from the single-variety count also determines the income expectation of these subsequent instances. If, for example, one or two out of twenty operators' accounts are not correct every day, fraud could also have occurred in the next higher instance. The information from the regular individual censuses also helps to draw the right conclusions here. This allows you to check for differences even if the operator has counted correctly but has been incorrectly accounted for. This assumption may arise if no regular surpluses are generated despite wallet control (see below).
Depending on the workflow, as well as the task and position of the respective operator, it may be better to display the cash target amount or not. For this purpose, there is a switch per operator or template in the operator authorisations. The background to this option is human error, because under particular stress it can regularly happen that bookings are not recorded in the POS system, even unintentionally. This should then lead to the existence of an excess of cash. If a lower expectation (the cash target amount) is now displayed during data entry, the operator could be influenced by the fact that he is no longer entering (and delivering) the full amount. On the one hand, he does not have to admit to not having booked something by mistake and, on the other hand, he can keep the money (as a "tip") for himself. See also Best practice with change.
With wallet control and especially without displaying the cash target amount, surpluses should occur regularly. Therefore, it is not primarily the causative operators who must be reprimanded, but rather the additional turnover or the additional tip must be booked in accordance with the regulations. This is the counterpart to booking forgotten cancellations retrospectively.
Strictly speaking, one could assume that complex human settlements must regularly result in subsequent cancellations, tips and turnovers having to be posted for correction. This type of posting should, on closer examination of the facts, increase rather than decrease the plausibility of any practical accounting.
Optionally you have the possibility in Wallet-Control to activate the support of several stock exchanges within one shift. This allows you, for example, to change the cash drawer or purse (unannounced) during operation and hand out a new change. This allows you to relate any differences at the time of replacement to billing irregularities. This could be done, for example, directly after (or before) a break substitution.
See the topic Global System Settings Wallet Control
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